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COMPETING POLICIES IN BANKRUPTCY: THE
GOVERNMENTAL EXCEPTION TO THE
AUTOMATIC STAY
Murray Tabb*
Section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 provides
an exception to the automatic stay for governmental actions brought
against a debtor to enforce police or regulatory powers. This article clas-
sies and discusses the cases decided under this section by subject, pay-
ing particular attention to judicial discussions of the "tests" developed
from the legislative history and from decisions under prior bankruptcy
laws. The author also provides greater insight into the area by evaluat-
ing the competing federal and state interests in debtor-creditor relations
and protection of the public health, safety, and welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
The automatic stay provided by section 362(a)' of the Bankruptcy
Visiting Instructor, University of Illinois College of Law; B.A., 1974, M.A., 1976, J.D.,
1982, University of Arkansas; LL.M. candidate, University of Illinois.
1. Title II U.S.C.A. § 362(a) provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section
301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commence-
ment of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
1
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Reform Act of 19782 (the Code) is one of the fundamental protections
afforded to debtors, principally because it gives them a respite from ac-
tions of creditors? Additionally, the automatic stay protects the inter-
ests of creditors by eliminating the need for a race to pursue remedies
against a debtor, thus facilitating the orderly administration of the
debtor's estate.' The automatic stay embraces both formal and informal
claims' or proceedings6 brought by all entities' against the debtor' or the
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of
a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982).
3. H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG, &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6297; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5840-41. The reports state: "[The stay] stops all collection efforts,
all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorgan-
ization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." Id.
4. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6297; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 49, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5835. The reports state:
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors
would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who
acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of
other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under
which all creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's
assets prevents that.
Id.; accord Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984).
5. The term "claim" was not defined in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, but is given a broad
definition under the new Bankruptcy Code as follows:
"claim" means-
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, un-
liquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a
right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982); see also Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 709 (1985) (debtor's obligation to
comply with a state court injunction requiring clean-up of a hazardous waste disposal site was a
liability on a claim subject to discharge under Bankruptcy Code). ,
6. 2 W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 362.04, at 362-27 (15th ed. Supp. 1984); see
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963,
6297; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 50, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5787,
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bankruptcy estate. Although the scope of the stay is broad, reaching all
legal and equitable interests of the debtor,9 it has certain limitations and
exceptions.'
5836. The reports state: "All proceedings are stayed, including arbitration, license revocation, ad-
ministrative, and judicial proceedings. Proceeding in this sense encompasses civil actions as well,
and all proceedings even if they are not before governmental tribunals." kd; see also Pizza of Ha-
waii, Inc. v. Department of Taxation (In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc.), 12 Bankr. 796, 798 (Bankr. D.
Hawaii 1981) (state Liquor Commission requirement that the debtor submit a tax clearance before
Commission would issue a renewal of debtor's liquor license constituted a "proceeding" within the
context of Code § 362(a)(1)).
7. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir. 1984).
"Entity" is defined to include persons, estates, trusts, and governmental units. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)
(1982). "Person" is defined to include individuals, partnerships, and corporations. 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 101(33) (Supp. 1985); see infra note 30 for the definition of "governmental unit."
8. Title 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1982) defines "debtor" as a "person or municipality concerning
which a case under this title has been commenced." On the other hand, third parties who are not
debtors under the Code are generally not afforded protection by the stay. See Office of Surface
Mining v. Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle, Inc. (In re Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle, Inc.), 34 Bankr.
696, 700 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin government suit
against third party non-debtor mining without valid permit in contravention of federal statute). In
Sewanee, the court stated that "[i]n order for a bankruptcy judge to assume jurisdiction over a
matter concerning a nonbankrupt individual, there must be a substantial relationship between the
matter in controversy and the bankruptcy case." Id. at 700. Also, property interests deemed outside
the scope of section 541(a) of the Code, defining property of the estate, are beyond the jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court and the coverage of the automatic stay. The legislative history of § 541 indi-
cates that the definition is intended to be given a broad interpretation:
The scope of this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible
or intangible property, causes of action (see Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6)), and all other forms
of property currently specified in section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act § 70a, as well as prop-
erty recovered by the trustee under section 542 of proposed title 11, if the property recov-
ered was merely out of the possession of the debtor, yet remained "property of the debtor."
The debtor's interest in property also includes "title" to property, which is an interest, just
as are a possessory interest, or leasehold interest, for example.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 367, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963,
6323, S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787,
5868. Examples of the broad scope of property of the estate include: Missouri v. United States
Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 1981) (possession coupled with minute ownership
interest in grain stored in warehouses); Coben v. Lebrun (In re Golden Plan, Inc.), 37 Bankr. 167,
170 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984) (corporate name); Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Licensing Bd. (In re Aegean
Fare, Inc.), 35 Bankr. 923, 927 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (a liquor license). But see FTC v. R.A.
Walker & Assoc., 37 Bankr. 608 (D.D.C. 1983) (assets acquired by fraud are not part of estate);
D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. v. Lake Erie Communications (In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting
Co.), 35 Bankr. 400, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (FCC license was not property of the estate
because it was merely a right granted by a government agency subject to restrictions on use, transfer,
or assignment, and revocation in certain instances); Fintel v. Oregon (In re Fintel), 10 Bankr. 50, 51
(Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (corporate surety bond posted by the debtor to obtain a contractor's license
was not property of the estate). Although state law defines interests in property, it is a matter of
federal law whether the property, as defined, is treated as property of the estate. Eg., In re Golden
Plan, Inc., 37 Bankr. at 169.
9. See Coben v. Lebrun (In re Golden Plan, Inc.), 37 Bankr. 167, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984);
In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 36 Bankr. 829, 833 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984); Briarcliff v. Briarcliff
Tenants Ass'n (In re Briarcliff), 15 Bankr. 864, 866 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981); 2 W. COLLIER, supra note
6, § 362.01, at 362-6.1.
10. There are eleven listed exceptions to the automatic stay, which are set forth at 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 362(b) as follows:
3
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One significant limitation, set forth in section 362(b)(4) of the Code,
excepts from the stay actions and proceedings by governmental units to
enforce police or regulatory powers.11 Courts have encountered diflicul-
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an appli-
cation under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay-
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continua-
tion of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor,
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, main-
tenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the extent that such act is ac-
complished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this title;(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or contin-
uation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such govern-
mental unit's police or regulatory power,
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judg-
ment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power,
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity bro-
ker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities
clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with com-
modity contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title, forward contracts, or
securities contracts, as defined in section 741(7) of this title, that constitutes the
setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section
741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8)
of this title, arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities
contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from such
commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution,
or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity
contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts;(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo participant,
of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase agreements
that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, asdefined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined
in section 741(8) of this title, arising out of repurchase agreements against cash,
securities, or other property held by or due from such repo participant to margin,
guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements;
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any action
by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or
deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by the
Secretary is insured or was formerly insured under the National Housing Act and
covers property, or combinations of property, consisting of five [or] more living
units;
(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a
governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency; or
[10] under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a lessor to the debtor
under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the expira-
tion of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during a case
under this title to obtain possession of such property;
[11] under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotiable
instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an
instrument.
11 U.S.C.A. § 362(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
4
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ties in resolving the inherent conflicts presented by the competing poli-
cies of the Code of protecting debtors from creditor actions, while at the
same time protecting the public from debtor conduct impacting health,
welfare, and safety.' 2 Courts, in applying section 362(b)(4), have fash-
ioned several tests which address the purpose of the governmental unit's
proceeding and its effect on the bankruptcy estate. These tests, however,
are not drawn from a literal reading of the exception, but principally
have been crafted from case law under the prior bankruptcy laws, from
the legislative history of the Code, and from some result-oriented judicial
engineering. As a result, an increasingly large body of case law has be-
come riddled with inconsistencies and occasional unfortunate results.
The purpose of this article is to provide a roadmap through the tests
used with respect to the governmental exception and to identify areas in
which the tests function effectively or inadequately. In order to aid this
analysis, cases which have dealt with section 362(b)(4) have been
grouped according to the general subject matter involved, including land
use, health and safety, labor, financial integrity, and securities regulation.
These categories, although imprecise, are also helpful in understanding
the underlying policy considerations involved in applying the govern-
mental exception to the stay, particularly since policy concerns which
have significance in one context may have little relevance to another type
of governmental proceeding.
Interpretation of the stay and the governmental exception centrally
involves questions of federal supremacy and pre-emption, reflecting an
express waiver of sovereign immunity of the federal government balanced
against an assertion of the federal bankruptcy power over state govern-
ment under the supremacy clause. 13 In that regard, two governmental
policies come into conflict in evaluating the applicability of the stay: the
federal bankruptcy policy encouraging preservation and protection of the
debtor's assets and equitable distribution to creditors versus the state po-
NEws 5963, 6299; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5838. The reports state:
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions and proceedings by
governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. Thus, where a governmental
unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, con-
sumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages
for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.
Id.
12. Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envt. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d Cir. 1984).
13. H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 3, at 342-43, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6298-99; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 51-52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5837-38; see also Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 272.
1985]
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lice or regulatory laws which impact upon the debtor or the debtor's
estate. 
14
The section 362(b)(4) exception to the stay gives the government a
"super-priority"1 5 in access to the appropriate court to enforce laws pro-
moting public health and welfare, but is not intended to give the govern-
ment any priority or preferential treatment over other creditors of the
estate with respect to pecuniary matters.16 The effect of the exception is
to shift the burden of requesting relief away from the excepted govern-
mental unit onto the debtor or bankruptcy trustee.1 7 If a governmental
proceeding is not excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to section
362(b)(4), the stay may still be vacated or modified by the court for
"cause" pursuant to section 362(d)(1) of the Code. This situation arises
when the balance of competing interests shifts away from protecting the
debtor toward advancing other more pressing policy concerns.1 8
If a debtor believes that improprieties exist in the manner in which
the governmental agency conducted a proceeding excepted from the stay,
the debtor may only challenge the actions according to state law in a
state court forum.19 Actions which are taken in violation of the stay,
however, are void,20 and an intentional disregard of the automatic stay
may result in a finding of civil contempt.2 1
14. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 269; Donovan v. TMC Indus., 20 Bankr. 997, 1001 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1982).
15. Donovan, 20 Bankr. at 1005.
16. Id.; accord Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 1981).
17. Marshall v. Tauscher (In re Tauscher), 7 Bankr. 918, 920 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981).
18. Title 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) provides:
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminat-
ing, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of
such party in interest ....
11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1982).
19. Herr v. Maine (In re Herr), 28 Bankr. 465, 466 n.2 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Alessi, 12
Bankr. 96, 97 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Cousins Restaurants, Inc., 11 Bankr. 521, 522 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1981).
20. Coben v. Lebrun (In re Golden Plan, Inc.), 37 Bankr. 167, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984).
21. Hill v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Hill), 19 Bankr. 375, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). In
Hill, the court stated:
Civil contempt remedies fall into two broad categories. It is remedial in that its pur-
pose is to make a recalcitrant party comply with an order of the court. It is compensatory
in that its purpose is to reimburse an injured party for losses and expenses incurred, be-
cause of the adversary's noncompliance.
Id. at 379; see also In re Sandmar Corp., 12 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (agents of Indian
tribe, who had actual notice of debtor-lessee's Chapter 11 filing, were found in civil contempt for
forceably obtaining debtor's property following his default in lease obligations). But see Revere Cop-
per Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. (In re Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.), 29
Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). In Revere, the court declined to hold a citizen's group in civil
[Vol. 21:183
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Most courts, following the legislative history to section 362(b)(4),
have narrowly construed the exception.22 However, in Penn Terra Ltd.
v. Department of Environmental Resources,13 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit relied upon the notion that federal pre-
emption of state law involving police or regulatory matters should not be
lightly inferred2 4 and thus adopted a broad construction of that excep-
tion.25  The Third Circuit's position, admittedly in contravention of ap-
plicable legislative history,26 stands as an isolated result against the great
weight of authority and creates an element of uncertainty in an area al-
ready difficult to define.
Also, several courts have further narrowed the section 362(b)(4) ex-
ception to only those exercises of police power which are "urgently"
needed to protect the public health, safety, or welfare.27 In one case, the
contempt for commencing an action against the debtor for alleged violations of federal environmen-
tal law and stated, "[i]t is within the sound discretion of the court to refuse to hold persons in
contempt for a violation of the automatic stay.... The contempt power is an awesome one and
should be reserved for actions showing a more clearly contumacious frame of mind." Id. at 588-89
(citations omitted).
22. The legislative history with respect to construing section 362(b)(4) is as follows:
Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the stay under section 362(a)(1) does not apply to
affect the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory power. This section is in-
tended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit governmental units to pursue
actions to protect the public health and safety and not to apply to actions by a governmen-
tal unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or property of the estate.
124 CONG. Rnc. HI1,089 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. N ws 6436, 6444-45; 124 CONG. REc. S17,406 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini), re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6505, 6513. For cases discussing these statements,
see In re Kennise Diversified Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 242 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Eisenberg v. Incor-
porated Village of Mineola (In re IDH Realty, Inc.), 16 Bankr. 55, 57 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981);
Schatzman v. Department of Health & Rehab. Serv. (In re King Memorial Hosp.), 4 Bankr. 704,708
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980); see also 2 W. COLLIER, COLLrER BANrKaurrcy MANUAL, § 362.04, at 362-
23 (3d ed. Supp. 1984).
23. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
24. Id. at 272-73. The court stated:
While Congress, under its Bankruptcy power, certainly has the constitutional preroga-
tive to pre-empt the States, even in their exercise of police power, the usual rule is that
congressional intent to pre-empt will not be inferred lightly. Pre-emption must either be
explicit, or compelled due to an unavoidable conflict between the state law and the federal
law. Consideration of whether a state provision violates the supremacy clause starts with
the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.
Proper respect, therefore, for the independent sovereignty of the several States re-
quires that federal supremacy be invoked only where it is clear that Congress so intended.
Statutes should therefore be construed to avoid pre-emption, absent an unmistakable indi-
cation to the contrary.
Id. (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 273.
26. Id. at 274 n.6.
27. Eisenberg v. Incorporated Village of Mineola (In re IDH Realty, Inc.), 16 Bankr. 55, 57
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Schatzman v. Department of Health & Rehab. Serv. (In re King Memorial
Hosp.), 4 Bankr. 704, 708 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
7
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court placed heavy emphasis on evidence showing that the governmental
unit lacked diligence in instituting its action against the debtor.28 The
court found that protecting the public health and welfare was not the
state's overriding motive in instituting the action, but that the state was
apparently motivated by matters relating to the debtor's financial difficul-
ties.2 9 To some extent, then, this may simply be a rephrasing of the pecu-
niary purpose test. A requirement of urgency, though, imposes an undue
burden of proof upon an otherwise valid exercise of a governmental
unit's police power.
An initial inquiry in application of section 362(b)(4) is whether the
action or proceeding is brought by a "governmental unit."3 The most
definitive examination of this threshold requirement appears in Revere
Copper Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. (In re Re-
vere Copper & Brass, Inc.),31 in which a citizen's group instituted a suit,
as private attorney general, against the debtor for alleged violations of
the Clean Water Act.32 The bankruptcy court, basing its decision upon
applicable legislative history,33 held that the section 362(b)(4) exception
excludes such private attorney general actions. 4 In contrast, in Illinois
28. King Memorial Hosp., 4 Bankr. at 708.
29. Id.
30. The term "governmental unit" is defined in § 101(24) to mean "United States; State; Com-
monwealth, District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality
of the United States, a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign
state; or other foreign or domestic government." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(24) (West Supp. 1985). Also,
note that section 362(b)(4) dovetails to some extent with the removal statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1452,
which provides that civil actions brought by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory
power are expressly excluded from being removed. The latter provision states:
(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action other than a pro-
ceeding before the United States Tax Court or a civil action by a governmental unit to
enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power, to the district court for the
district where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such
claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.
(b) The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim
or cause of action on any equitable ground. An order entered under this subsection re-
manding a claim or cause of action, or a decision to not remand, is not reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1452 (West Supp. 1985). In applying the former removal statute, the following did
not constitute "civil actions" and were thus not removable: Caldwell v. Internationale Resort &
Beach Club (In re Internationale Resort & Beach Club), 36 Bankr. 189, 192 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983)
(arbitration action before state real estate commission); NLRB v. Adams Delivery Serv. (In re Ad-
ams Delivery Serv.), 24 Bankr. 589, 592 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (NLRB backpay liquidation action).
31. 29 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
32. Id. at 585.
33. Id. at 587. "Entities that operate through state action such as through the grant of a char-
ter or license, and have no further connection with the state or federal government are not within the
contemplation of the definition." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 311; S. REP. No.
989, supra note 3, at 24).
34. Id. at 587-88; see also In re Colin, Hochstin Co., 41 Bankr. 322, 324 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
8
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v. Electrical Utilities,3" a state suing under the "private citizens" provi-
sion of a federal environmental statute was deemed a governmental unit
within the meaning of section 362(b)(4), as the court stated that the ex-
ception focused on the identity of the plaintiff instead of the statute creat-
ing the cause of action. 6
Assuming that an action involves a governmental unit, two primary
tests are used with respect to the purpose of the government's proceeding
to determine whether the section 362(b)(4) exception is available. The
first test evaluates whether the government proceeding is to enforce laws
affecting the public health and welfare or is instead to obtain a pecuniary
benefit for the government in preference to other creditors of the bank-
ruptcy estate. The second test focuses on whether the proceeding essen-
tially involves matters affecting public policy or instead concerns the
adjudication of private rights. If a government's action has satisfied both
the pecuniary purpose and public policy tests, some courts have consid-
ered the effect of the governmental action on the debtor's estate-inquir-
ing whether the proceeding poses such a threat to the estate's assets that
the court, for countervailing policy considerations, would be justified in
enjoining the action pursuant to the court's equitable discretion under
section 105(a) of the Code.
A. Pecuniary Purpose Test
The "pecuniary purpose test" is phrased in the negative in that pro-
1984) (New York Stock Exchange was not considered a governmental entity within purview of
§ 362(b)(4)); Continental Airlines v. National Mediation Bd. (In re Continental Airlines), 40 Bankr.
299, 305 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984) (National Mediation Board was not considered a governmental
unit within the meaning of § 362(b)(4) because the Board had no enforcement function); In re
Sandmar Corp., 12 Bankr. 910, 916 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (court acknowledged that the Navajo
Indian Tribe is arguably a governmental entity, but still would not receive a blanket exemption from
automatic stay by that status-the court would inquire into the purpose behind any actions brought
by the entity); In re JJ. Bradley & Co., 6 Bankr. 529, 538 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (court in dicta
noted that the National Association of Securities Dealers, being a private organization, would not be
characterized as a governmental unit for purposes of § 362(b)(4), irrespective of any close working
association with the SEC). But see Swan v. Dervos (In re Dervos), 37 Bankr. 731 (Bankr. N.D. Il.
1984) (the court relied upon In re Briarcliff and stated that it was not fatal to a complaint filed under
§ 362(b)(4) that the complaint was not actually filed by a governmental unit). This reliance appears
misplaced in light of the legislative history to 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (see supra note 30), particularly
since Briarcliff was a Chapter XII arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and thus did not
involve construction of section 101(24) or 362(b)(4) of the Code. See also D.H. Overmyer Telecast-
ing Co. v. Lake Erie Communications (In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co.), 35 Bankr. 400, 403
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) ("If the actions of regulatory agencies were exempt from the stay, private
petitions invoking the authority of the regulatory agency were also exempt.").
35. 41 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
36. Id. at 876. The court also noted that § 362(b)(4) did not distinguish between a state action
brought under a state law and one under federal law. Id. at 876-77.
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ceedings brought by governmental units may fall within the section
362(b)(4) exception only when they involve matters affecting the public
health and welfare. The test contrasts proceedings in which governmen-
tal units attempt to exercise their police power in a manner that inter-
feres with property of the estate or that prefers or injures creditors.17
This test has received such increased attention by courts applying section
362(b)(4), that it may be considered the linchpin of whether a govern-
mental proceeding is excepted from the automatic stay.
The pecuniary purpose test has been derived in part from language
in the legislative history to section 362(b)(4)38 and also from the case of
Perez v. Campbell.39 In Perez, the Supreme Court addressed the conflict
between an Arizona statute which imposed certain financial responsibil-
ity requirements on the bankruptcy debtors and the Bankruptcy Act pro-
visions and policy which gave debtors a full discharge from obligations in
order to have a new start unhampered by preexisting debts.' The Court
held4' that, to the extent that the state law effectively frustrated the dis-
charge granted to the debtors under the federal bankruptcy laws, the
state law would be deemed violative of the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution.42
Examples of the varied instances in which the pecuniary purpose
test has been applied to governmental unit proceedings, resulting in a
denial of the section 362(b)(4) exception, include: a state department of
agriculture attempt to operate and liquidate insolvent grain ware-
houses,43 an attempt to condition the transfer of a debtor's liquor license
upon payment of delinquent taxes,' an administrative proceeding in re-
gard to the debtor's medicaid reimbursement entitlements, 4 an action to
obtain funds from an escrow account established by the debtor as a com-
37. In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 36 Bankr. 829, 833 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984); In re Rath Pack-
ing Co., 35 Bankr. 615, 621 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983); Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Licensing Bd. (In re
Aegean Fare, Inc.), 35 Bankr. 923, 927 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); Greenwald v. Axelrod (In re Green-
wald), 34 Bankr. 954, 956-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Herr v. Maine (In re Herr), 28 Bankr. 465,
468 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Mason, 18 Bankr. 817, 821 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982); Muzio v.
Sampson (In re Sampson), 17 Bankr. 528, 530-31 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).
38. 124 CONG. REc. H1l,089 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17,406 (1978); see supra note 22 for
text of legislative history.
39. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
40. Id. at 648-49.
41. Id. at 656.
42. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
43. Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 1981).
44. In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 36 Bankr. 829, 833 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984).
45. Greenwald v. Axelrod (In re Greenwald), 34 Bankr. 954, 957 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
[Vol. 21:183
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pletion guarantee of a land development project," and the revocation of
a debtor's self-insurance status by a state insurance commissioner based
upon the debtor's insolvency.47
Conversely, an administrative proceeding by a state board of medi-
cal quality assurance for revocation of a physician's license involving al-
legations of gross negligence and fraudulent financial dealings was
deemed a valid exercise of police and regulatory power, rather than the
mere protection of a governmental pecuniary interest.48 Also, a state
board's denial of a debtor's license to race horses because the debtor
failed to meet certain financial responsibility requirements was deter-
mined by judicial notice to be a proper enforcement of the state's police
power.49
B. Public Policy Test
A second, but seldom used, test applied by courts in determining
whether a particular governmental proceeding against a debtor is ex-
cepted from the automatic stay is loosely termed the "public policy
test."50 This test provides that when a governmental agency does not
attempt to effectuate public policy, but instead seeks to adjudicate private
rights, the section 362(b)(4) exception is inapplicable."1
For example, proceedings before the NLRB have aspects of private
litigation because they are commenced by aggrieved individuals, but one
court has determined that the purpose of such proceedings primarily in-
volves public policy considerations.52 In contrast, proceedings before a
state motor vehicle commission concerning termination of a franchise
agreement were held principally to affect only the rights of private parties
rather than the general public and were thus subject to the automatic
stay.5" Therefore, governmental proceedings which merely involve deter-
46. Heckler Land Dev. Corp. v. Township of Montgomery (In re Heckler Land Dev. Corp.), 15
Bankr. 856, 858 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
47. In re Rath Packing Co., 35 Bankr. 615, 622 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983).
48. Thomassen v. Division of Medical Quality Assurance (In re Thomassen), 15 Bankr. 907,
909 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981).
49. In re Alessi, 12 Bankr. 96, 98-99 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
50. Herr v. Maine (In re Herr), 28 Bankr. 465, 468 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
51. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co. (In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet
Co.), 12 Bankr. 917, 921 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
52. D.M. Barber, Inc. v. Valverde (In re D.M. Barber, Inc.), 13 Bankr. 962, 963 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1981).
53. Dan Hixson Chevrolet, 12 Bankr. at 921-22. The court stated:
A single agency may as to one function exercise judicial powers, and as to other and
different functions exercise executive or legislative powers. The major consideration in
determining whether an administrative agency is exercising a legislative or judicial function
19851
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minations of rights of private parties should be stayed, while actions re-
lating to the enforcement of police or regulatory matters impacting the
general public should pass the public policy test.54 This point has seldom
been articulated, but should be considered by courts in evaluating the
purpose of the particular government proceeding against the debtor or
the debtor's estate.
C. Injunctions Under Section 105(a)
Even if a particular proceeding by a governmental unit satisfies the
pecuniary purpose and public policy tests, a bankruptcy court still has
the discretion to enjoin the action pursuant to section 105(a) of the
Code.55 Courts have cautiously exercised this power, based upon the leg-
islative history to section 105(a)56 and upon case law under the prior
is whether the agency's action concerns only parties who are immediately affected or a
wider group of those subject to the authority of the agency or even the public as a whole.
The chameleon-like character of the administrative agencies complicates the proper appli-
cation of the automatic stay to their various activities.
Id. at 920 (citations omitted); see also Donovan v. LaPorta (In re LaPorta), 26 Bankr. 687, 691
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982) (discussing functions of administrative agencies).
54. Dan Hixrson Chevrolet, 12 Bankr. at 920. But see Ohio v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In
re Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.), 660 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1981). In that case the court stated:
This court can find no basis of any distinction between the enactment of workers' compen-
sation laws as a valid exercise of a state's police or regulatory power on the one hand, and
the administration of claims arising under such laws as not being an exercise or extension
of that power on the other.
Id. at 1113.
55. Section 105(a) provides: "The bankruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (West
Supp. 1985).
56. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5787, 5837; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6298-99. The reports state:
The court has ample other powers to stay actions not covered by the automatic stay.
Section 105, of proposed title 11, derived from Bankruptcy Act § 2a(15), grants the power
to issue orders necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of title 1.... Stays or
injunctions issued under these other sections will not be automatic upon the commence-
ment of the case, but will be granted or issued under the usual rules for the issuance of
injunctions. By excepting an act or action from the automatic stay, the bill simply requires
that the trustee move the court into action, rather than requiring the stayed party to re-
quest relief from the stay. There are some actions, enumerated in the exceptions, that
generally should not be stayed automatically upon the commencement of the case, for
reasons of either policy or practicality. Thus, the court will have to determine on a case-
by-case basis whether a particular action which may be harming the estate should be
stayed.
With respect to stays issued under other powers, or the application of the automatic
stay, to governmental actions, this section and the other sections mentioned are intended to
be an express waiver of sovereign immunity of the Federal Government, and an assertion
of the bankruptcy power over State governments under the Supremacy Clause notwith-
standing a State's sovereign immunity.
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 21 [1985], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol21/iss2/1
COMPETING POLICIES
Bankruptcy Act,57 when it appears that the government proceeding poses
a "threat to the assets" of the debtor's estate.18 These cases are difficult
to reconcile, particularly because they typically involve a balancing ap-
proach of relative hardships and because the underlying policy consider-
ations are often either omitted or conclusory. As a result, the
precedential value of these cases is limited and only serves to illustrate
that a court's power to fashion an appropriate remedy is not limited to
the terms of section 362. A discretionary stay, for example, has been
issued to provide a trustee additional time to file a response to pending
litigation to avoid a default judgment,59 to enjoin a state agency from
suspending or revoking the debtor's liquor license, necessary for an effec-
tive reorganization, 6' and to enjoin all acts of the NLRB with respect to
the debtor other than the collection of information necessary to liquidate
and fie its claim in the bankruptcy estate.6 '
A court is not limited in utilizing section 105(a) to instances involv-
ing possession of property or a pending state court proceeding, but its
availability enables the court to do whatever may be necessary relating to
the bankruptcy case.62 Therefore, the interplay between section 105(a)
and section 362(b)(4) is often tenuous, as the courts place primary focus
on the hardship to the debtor's estate rather than on the purpose or effect
of the governmental proceeding. In short, section 105(a) is a type of last
57. Id.; see Shippers Interstate Serv., 618 F.2d 9, 13 (7th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Jonas (In re Bel
Air Chateau Hosp.), 611 F.2d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979).
58. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 6, § 105.02, at 105-3; see Coben v. Lebrun (In re Golden Plan,
Inc.), 37 Bankr. 167, 170 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984); Donovan v. LaPorta (In re LaPorta), 26 Bankr.
687, 691 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1982); In re Mason, 18 Bankr. 817, 821 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982); D.M.
Barber, Inc. v. Valverde (In re D.M. Barber, Inc.), 13 Bankr. 962, 965 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
59. Hudtwalker v. United States Dep't of Energy (In re Vantage Petroleum Corp.), 25 Bankr.
471, 476 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
60. In re Mason, 18 Bankr. 817, 822 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982). But see In re Arnage, Inc., 33
Bankr. 662, 665 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
61. D.M. Barber, Inc. v. Valverde (In re D.M. Barber, Inc.), 13 Bankr. 962, 965 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1981). One court, in issuing a discretionary stay pursuant to section 105(a), employed the same
test that a federal court would use in granting a preliminary injunction:
The standard in the Second Circuit for injunctive relief clearly calls for a showing of
(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a bal-
ance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.
Hudtwalker v. United States Dep't of Energy (In re Vantage Petroleum Corp.), 25 Bankr. 471, 477
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); see also Coben v. Lebrun (In re'Golden Plan, Inc.), 37 Bankr. 167, 170
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984) ("Before a court can issue a permanent injunction, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant's actions will cause irreparable harm and that no adequate remedy at law exists.")
(citation omitted).
62. 2 W. COLLIER, supra note 6, § 105.02, at 105-3. For a survey of cases involving § 105(a),
see 2 W. COLLIER, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GuIE, § 39.03 (lst ed. 1981).
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resort available to a debtor to halt a governmental proceeding that other-
wise has a valid purpose.
D. 28 U.S.C. § 959
In addition to the exception from the automatic stay afforded cer-
tain governmental proceedings, several courts have applied 28 U.S.C.§ 95963 to require a debtor to conduct its business operations in accord-
ance with state law. This section has somewhat limited utility, however,
because it has been held to apply only to the enforcement of state, and
not federal laws," and only covers acts by the debtor which occur after
the bankruptcy petition is filed.6" Section 959 has been utilized to ensure
that a debtor-in-possession operated a quarry in compliance with state air
pollution control laws, 66 to require that a third party non-debtor obtain a
valid state permit to conduct surface mining operations,67 to invoke ap-
plication of local housing code ordinances with respect to buildings
owned by the debtor,68 and to form the basis for dismissal of a bank-
ruptcy case when it was considered impossible for the trustee to manage
the debtor's hazardous waste site in accordance with state law.69
63. This section provides:
(a) Trustees, receivers or managers of any property, including debtors in possession, may
be sued, without leave of the court appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or
transactions in carrying on business connected with such property. Such actions shall be
subject to the general equity power of such court so far as the same may be necessary to the
ends ofjustice, but this shall not deprive a litigant of his right to trial by jury.
(b) Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or manager ap-
pointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, including a debtor in
possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession as such trustee, re-
ceiver or manager according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which
such property is situated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be
bound to do if in possession thereof.
28 U.S.C. § 959 (1982).
64. Revere Copper Products, Inc. v. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. (In re Revere Cop-
per & Brass, Inc.), 29 Bankr. 584, 588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
65. Id. Section 959 may be contrasted with section 362(b)(4), which does not turn on whether
the police or regulatory power is exercised with respect to pre-petition or post-petition conduct of
the debtor, but primarily involves the nature and purpose of the government's action. In re Kennise
Diversified Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983). In Kennise, however, the court found
that a reasonable likelihood existed that certain pre-petition violations by the debtor would continue
indefinitely into the future, thus justifying application of 28 U.S.C. § 959. Id. at 243.
66. In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D.P.R. 1979).
67. Office of Surface Mining v. Sewanee Land, Coal & Cattle, Inc. (In re Sewane Land, Coal &
Cattle, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 696, 702 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
68. In re Kennise Diversified Corp., 34 Bankr. 237, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
69. In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust, 30 Bankr. 918, 921 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
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II. APPLICATION OF SECTION 362(b)(4)
A. Land Use
An increasingly large body of case law has dealt with whether at-
tempts by federal, state, and local agencies to force debtors to comply
with zoning or environmental laws are excepted from the automatic stay
under section 362(b)(4). The courts which have addressed such land use
questions have often been faced with strong conflicting policy concerns-
the Bankruptcy Code policy of giving the debtor a breathing spell from
creditor actions versus protecting the public from a debtor conducting its
business in a hazardous manner.
Historically, courts have not adequately separated, for section
362(b)(4) purposes, the underlying policy considerations according to the
nature of the subject matter involved. One thesis submitted by this arti-
cle is that the policy concerns which govern, for example, whether a
debtor should be permitted to operate its business as a non-conforming
use, have little relevance to another case in which a governmental agency
seeks to prevent a debtor from polluting the environment. In each in-
stance, courts have utilized the pecuniary purpose and public policy tests
and sometimes have considered the effect of the governmental action, but
additional analysis is required to tailor the inquiry according to the na-
ture of the harm which the government seeks to remedy.
1. Environmental Protection
Bankruptcy courts have strongly favored permitting governmental
units to proceed, under section 362(b)(4), with environmental protection
actions against debtors. When such cases involve state and federal laws
which require the expenditure of funds by debtors to clean up waste dis-
posal sites or other types of land reclamation projects, an inherent con-
flict is presented in classifying the government's enforcement action as a
proper police power function regarding environmental protection, as op-
posed to an improper taking of the debtor's property for the pecuniary
benefit of the government.
A leading pre-Code case, In re Canarico Quarries, Ina,7 dealt with
whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to stay the Puerto Rico
Environmental Quality Board from enforcing its regulations regarding
air pollution against the operation of a quarry by the debtor-in-posses-
70. 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979).
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sion.71 Shortly before the debtor filed a petition under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act, the Board issued a cease and desist order against the
debtor's operation of the quarry for alleged violations of state regulations
promulgated pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act.72 The bankruptcy
court, however, issued an order authorizing the debtor to continue oper-
ating its business.
On appeal, the district court recognized the conflicting policies at
issue: that the primary purpose of the Clean Air Act was to protect the
public from the dangers of air pollution, while one aim of the bankruptcy
laws was to protect the debtor's property from creditor interference
which might hinder the proper administration of the case.73 The court
resolved those conflicting policies by finding that the bankruptcy court
had no express congressional authority to intervene in environmental
matters, that the debtor's rehabilitation must be accomplished in compli-
ance with applicable state laws, and that Chapter XI Rules were in-
tended to be procedural in nature and were not meant to enlarge or
modify substantive rights.74 In other words, the bankruptcy court could
not authorize the debtor to operate its business without the necessary
state law permit.
Similarly, Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Re-
sources7" considered whether the Pennsylvania Department of Environ-
mental Resources would be permitted, under section 362(b)(4), to
enforce a state court injunction against the debtor with respect to certain
state environmental laws.76 The Department had obtained a post-peti-
tion injunction to correct violations of the state environmental laws and
to enforce the terms of a pre-petition consent order establishing a plan
for reclamation of the debtor's coal surface mines. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and remanded with di-
rections that the bankruptcy court vacate its injunction against the
Department.77
The Third Circuit recognized that the policies of the Bankruptcy
Code with respect to preservation of the debtor's assets conflicted with
the state environmental policies of protecting natural resources and cor-
71. Id. at 1339.
72. Id. at 1334.
73. Id. at 1337.
74. Id. at 1339.
75. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
76. Id. at 269. The Department had claimed violations by the debtor of the Pennsylvania Clean
Streams Law and the Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act. Id. n.I.
77. Id. at 279.
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recting damage to the environment.7" The court stated that interpreta-
tion of the automatic stay primarily involved questions of federal
supremacy and pre-emption and that pre-emption would neither be in-
ferred lightly nor favored.79 The court reasoned that the term "police
and regulatory powers" in section 362(b)(4) should be construed
broadly 0 and determined that a government action to rectify harmful
environmental hazards was a valid exercise of the state's police power.8'
The court then held that an "enforcement of a money judgment,"
prohibited by section 362(b)(5) of the Code, was not indicated when the
Department's injunction "was not intended to provide compensation for
past injuries" and "was not reduceable [sic] to a sum certain."8 2 The
Third Circuit characterized as "unduly broad" the lower court's view
that the definition of "money judgment" contemplated and encompassed
anything which costs money to enforce.8 3 The Third Circuit in Penn
Terra disagreed with the Sixth Circuit's construction of the definition of
"money judgment" in section 362(b)(5) in Ohio v. Kovacs (In re Ko-
vacs). 4 In Kovacs, the Sixth Circuit held that a state court appointment
of a receiver to take possession of the debtor's property and to clean up a
hazardous waste site amounted to an "enforcement of a money judg-
ment" within the meaning of section 362(b)(5) and automatically stayed
the actions.8 5 It is unclear which Circuit's approach will be followed, as
the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Kovacs 6 considered only
whether the debtor's obligation to clean up the waste site was a "claim"
dischargeable in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit's construction of
"money judgment" appears to be the better view in light of the legislative
78. Id. at 269.
79. Id. at 272.
80. Id. at 273; see supra notes 22-25.
81. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274.
82. Id. at 279; see supra note 10 for text of § 362(b)(5). The court explained that the section
creates an "exception to the exception" under section 362(b)(4), in that actions to enforce money
judgments are halted by the automatic stay even if they otherwise demonstrate a valid furtherance of
the state's police power. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 272. The court cited with approval the following
legislative history to section 362(b)(5):
Paragraph (5) makes clear that the exception extends to permit an injunction and
enforcement of an injunction, and to permit the entry of a money judgment, but does not
extend to permit enforcement of a money judgment. Since the assets of the debtor are in
the possession and control of the bankruptcy court, and since they constitute a fund out of
which all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by a government unit of a money
judgment would give it preferential treatment to the detriment of all other creditors.
Id. at 272 (quoting H.R. RaP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 343; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 52).
83. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 277.
84. 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983).
85. Id. at 456.
86. 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985).
19851
17
Tabb: Competing Policies in Bankruptcy: The Governmental Exception to t
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
history to section 362(b)(5) 7 and considering that a literalist approach to
the phrase would virtually emasculate section 362(a)(2).
Similarly, In re Charles George Land Reclamation Trust88 involved
a governmental action to force clean-up of the debtor's hazardous waste
site. As a result of a suit brought by the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts through its Department of Environmental Quality Engineering, the
debtor had agreed, prior to filing for bankruptcy relief, to the entry of a
consent judgment which required it to pay a civil fine and to bring its
waste disposal facility into compliance with applicable environmental
laws. Additionally, a state court order compelled the debtor to make
payments into a special trust account with withdrawals applied for pay-
ment of a groundwater hydrology study and for closure of the site.
When the debtor defaulted in payment of its obligations and illegally dis-
charged hazardous waste into a catch basin which drained into the
source of drinking water for several communities, the trustee, joined by
the Commonwealth and a township, moved for dismissal of the debtor's
bankruptcy case.8 9
The court recognized the conflict between 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), which
requires a trustee or debtor-in-possession to operate property in his pos-
session in compliance with state laws, and the view that government ac-
tions should not be excepted from the automatic stay when they involve
substantial expenditures by the debtor. 90 However, since the trustee
could not comply with the applicable environmental laws and because
the threat to the public welfare was serious and immediate, the court
decided to dismiss the bankruptcy case.91
87. See supra note 82.
88. 30 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
89. Id. at 920.
90. Id. at 921 n.5; see supra note 63 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b).
91. Land Reclamation, 30 Bankr. at 924-25. The court stated:
This was not a bankruptcy case where assets could be liquidated, claims adjudicated and a
distribution made within a relatively short period of time, but rather it was and is an ongo-
ing environmental nuisance that threatens the health, safety and well-being of the people
who surround it. The dismissal of this case was a recognition by this Court that the appro-
priate forum to redress and correct this environmental nuisance in the most expeditious
and efficient manner was the State court. This Court had neither the resources, the exper-
tise or, for that matter, a suitably qualified trustee with experience in hazardous waste
management, to do other than to allow the resolution of this matter by the continuing
efforts of the appropriate state court. The specter of a dividend in this case was not suffi-
cient to justify the exposure of the surrounding populace to the possibility of a reoccur-
rence of another leachate discharge, similar to that which took place during the Debtor's
Chapter 11 proceedings. Dismissal, with the concomitant elimination of the automatic
stay, would allow the EPA and DEQE to assert their fu panoply of powers under the
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The court in Hudtwalker v. United States Department of Energy (In
re Vantage Petroleum Corp.)92 took a different approach when faced with
whether section 362(b)(4) applied to an administrative proceeding
against the debtor by the DOE concerning pre-petition violations of cer-
tain federal gasoline price guidelines.9" The court analyzed the goals of
the federal legislation, determined that the regulations were a valid exer-
cise of the government's police power,94 and held that the DOE would
not be stayed from liquidating its claim against the debtor absent an in-
junction issued pursuant to the bankruptcy court's equitable powers.95
Because the possible entry of a nonreviewable default judgment in
favor of the DOE against the debtor was a sufficient threat to the estate,
the court exercised its power pursuant to section 105 and granted the
trustee additional time to file an appropriate response to the administra-
tive action.96 The court acknowledged that the "threat to the assets of
the estate" test was satisfied by potential government agency enforcement
actions rather than adjudicatory activities, but determined that section
105 could have a broader utility, particularly since section 362 automati-
cally stayed enforcement activity.97
2. Zoning
In contrast to the predominant judicial view permitting governmen-
tal units to enforce environmental laws against debtors under section
362(b)(4), the majority of courts have determined that actions to enforce
zoning laws against debtors are outside the scope of section 362(b)(4) and
thus subject to the automatic stay. Perhaps the reason for this dichot-
omy is that the government's action is motivated by different policy con-
cerns. While the harm to the public may be evident and immediate when
a debtor is violating environmental laws, the policy of forcing a debtor to
operate its business as a conforming use, for example, may be more read-
92. 25 Bankr. 471 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
93. Id. at 475.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court noted, however, that the DOE would be stayed from collecting on a judg-
ment it might obtain without leave of court. Such leave would be inappropriate in this instance
because it would cause the DOE or the public to receive a preference to other creditors of the
bankruptcy estate. Id. n.9. But see United States v. Energy Int'l, Inc., 19 Bankr. 1020, 1021 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1981) (action by the Department of the Interior to collect a civil penalty assessed against
the debtor for certain violations of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 was to
enforce the government's regulatory power and therefore was within the § 362(b)(4) exception to the
automatic stay). The holding in Energy Int'l seems to violate the pecuniary purpose test and should
have been subject to the automatic stay, as the relief granted the Department was purely monetary.
96. Vantage Petroleum, 25 Bankr. at 476-77.
97. Id. at 476.
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ily characterized as motivated by financial considerations than by a de-
sire to protect the public.
For example, Eisenberg v. Incorporated Village of Mineola (In re
IDH Realty, Inc.)98 considered whether a municipality would be stayed
from reclassifying the debtor's restaurant operations as a non-conforming
use under its zoning code.99 Approximately eleven years before filing its
Chapter 7 petition, the debtor had been authorized by the municipality to
construct and operate a restaurant as a permitted use under the zoning
district classification. Several years later, the municipality amended its
zoning code to change the restaurant operation from a permitted to a
conditional use. One section of the zoning ordinance provided that ces-
sation of operation of a non-conforming use for a period greater than six
months was deemed an abandonment of the right to operate the non-
conforming use, absent issuance of a special exception permit." ° When
the debtor filed its bankruptcy petition, only two months had run on the
six-month grace period. The trustee sought to liquidate the debtor's as-
sets approximately thirteen months after the debtor had ceased its restau-
rant operations. The trustee contended that the automatic stay tolled the
six-month grace period and stayed the zoning enforcement."' The mu-
nicipality asserted that the premises had been abandoned in excess of the
six-month period, resulting in a forfeiture of the non-conforming use
98. 16 Bankr. 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
99. Id. at 57. A similar situation was presented in National Hosp. & Inst. Builders v. Goldstein
(In re National Hosp. & Inst. Builders), 658 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, Goldstein v. Gar-
rity, 454 U.S. 1149 (1982), decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. In Goldstein, the court held
that the New York City Department of Buildings was stayed from proceeding to revoke the certifi-
cate of occupancy for the debtor's nursing home. The city contended that the facility had become a
nonconforming use after amendment of its zoning ordinances, thereby causing forfeiture of the
debtor's certificate of occupancy when the business was not operated for two years. On remand of
the city's motion for relief from the stay, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the lower court should review the finding that the city was pursuing the revocation in bad
faith. The court stated:
Contrary to the City's assertions, it is neither unseemly nor unusual for the bank-
ruptcy court to examine issues of state zoning law to determine whether the intended revo-
cation is marred by procedural or substantive defects. We emphasize that the purpose of
the bankruptcy laws-to allow the trustee without delay to marshal and administer the
assets of the debtor-would be frustrated were state officials free to interfere with the ad-
ministration of the bankrupt's estate through bad faith zoning regulation.
Goldstein, 658 F.2d at 44. The Second Circuit noted that bad faith involved more "than an errone-
ous determination of law or fact," but meant that the zoning law was unconstitutional, the forum
was biased, the city wilfully disregarded the law, the city officials clearly abused their discretion in
initiating proceedings against the trustee, or the proceedings were motivated by a desire to harass the
debtor. Id.
100. IDH Realty, 16 Bankr. at 56.
101. Id. at 57.
[Vol. 21:183
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The court stated that section 362(b)(4) was limited to the "enforce-
ment" of police powers or regulatory law and that the derogation of local
law must exist at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed for a munici-
pality to enforce its zoning ordinances in spite of the automatic stay. x03
The court reasoned that since only two months of the abandonment pe-
riod had elapsed at the date that the petition was filed, the municipality
had no enforceable rights against the debtor."° As a consequence, the
post-filing zoning reclassification was premature and untimely as an en-
forcement action and was therefore stayed. 05 Furthermore, the court
stated that enforcement of the zoning statute was not the sort of exercise
of police power "urgently" needed to protect the public health and
welfare. 10
6
Similarly, Island Club Marina, Ltd. v. Lee County (In re Island Club
Marina, Ltd.)"°7 dealt with whether the automatic stay would bar a
county from changing its zoning density regulations applicable to some
building permits obtained by the debtor pre-petition.'0l The debtor had
obtained proper building permits for construction of a condominium
complex and, in reliance upon the permits, had incurred substantial con-
struction costs prior to filing its petition in bankruptcy. Several months
after the debtor fied its petition, the county enacted a new zoning ordi-
nance which reduced the maximum density of units allowed on the
debtor's property.
The bankruptcy court concluded that section 362(b)(4) did not per-
mit the county to change its zoning density regulations for the debtor's
premises."° The court based its holding on several factors: that the
county failed to demonstrate (1) that the purpose of the ordinance was to
protect the health and safety of its residents; (2) that the zoning change
was "urgently" needed to protect the public welfare; and (3) that the
purpose of the action was not to protect a pecuniary interest in the
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court stated that "[t]he running of the abandonment period ... was the necessary
contingent event to the creation of such a right." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
107. 38 Bankr. 847 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1984).
108. Id. at 854.
109. Id. But see Lacoquille Inv. Co. v. Town of Manalapan (In re Lacoquille Inv. Co.), 44
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debtor's estate.11°
An egregious example of an improperly motivated governmental ac-
tion under the guise of section 362(b)(4) was addressed in Heckler Land
Development Corp. v. Township of Montgomery (In re Heckler Land De-
velopment Corp.)."' In Heckler, the debtor had entered into a land de-
velopment agreement with a township several years before filing for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Code."I2 As part of the development agreement
and as required by the township's subdivision ordinance, the debtor had
established an escrow account to serve as a completion guarantee ac-
count. When the debtor failed to finish the project, the township com-
pleted certain improvements at the project site. Subsequently, the
township brought an action in state court seeking reimbursement from
the escrow account for expenses incurred in connection with the
improvements.
The court, based on the legislative history to section 362(b)(4),' t3
stated that Congress had "intended to protect debtors from the collection
efforts of governmental units and to preserve the assets of the estate for
orderly administration while allowing governing bodies to enforce neces-
sary measures to preserve the public health and welfare.""' 4 The court
properly characterized the township's efforts to seek reimbursement as
an attempt to collect an indebtedness, rather than an effort to enforce
110. Island Club Marina, 38 Bankr. at 853-54. The court stated that the debtor was protected
by 11 U.S.C. § 525 from discriminatory treatment by a governmental unit. Section 525(a) provides,
in pertinent part:
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit,
charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with
respect to such a grant against... a person that is or has been a debtor under this title or a
bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bank-
rupt or debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a
debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insol-
vent before the commencement of the case under this title, or during the case but before the
debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the
case under this title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.
I1 U.S.C.A. § 525(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). Section 525(a), then, prohibits governmental units
from discriminating against the debtor solely on the basis of the debtor's seeking relief under the
Bankruptcy Code. The court in Island Club Marina stated that although an applicant's financial
status was one factor which a licensing agency could evaluate in determining whether to grant a
building permit, the agency could not refuse to grant a permit merely because the applicant had filed
a bankruptcy petition. 38 Bankr. at 854. But see S. REP. No. 989, supra note 3, at 81, reprinted In
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5867 (Section 525 "does not prohibit consideration of
other factors, such as future financial responsibility or ability, and does not prohibit imposition of
requirements such as net capital rules, if applied nondiscriminatorily.").
111. 15 Bankr. 856 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
112. Id. at 857.
113. Id. at 858 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 342-43; S. REP. No. 989, supra note
3, at 51-52); see supra note 11 for text of legislative history.
114. Heckler, 15 Bankr. at 858.
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public health, safety, or welfare requirements. Accordingly, the court
found the action outside the exception of section 362(b)(4). 115
On the other hand, the pecuniary purpose test was satisfied in In re
Cousins Restaurants, Ina,116 where a town sought enforcement in state
court of a local zoning ordinance which would require a debtor-in-pos-
session to obtain a special use permit. The debtor had operated its prop-
erty as a restaurant and had obtained the special permit required for
restaurants. However, when the debtor changed operations to a night-
club disco several months before filing a petition under Chapter 11 of the
Code, it failed to obtain a new special use permit. The court held that
the town's action to enforce its zoning laws was a proper exercise of a
governmental unit's police or regulatory power and, therefore, not sub-
ject to the automatic stay.11 7 The court further stated that if the debtor
believed that the zoning requirement of a special use permit was arbi-
trary, then the proper forum for protection of the debtor's rights would
be the state courts. 1 8 The court failed, however, to identify any public
welfare concerns which would pass muster under the pecuniary purpose
test and simply concluded that the zoning enforcement was valid. This
type of conclusory analysis fails to recognize that the automatic stay is
the general rule, while section 362(b)(4) is the exception and must be
available only when necessary to advance interests affecting the public
health, safety, or welfare.
B. Health and Safety
The cases which have dealt with the applicability of section
362(b)(4) in the context of health and safety laws are extremely diverse.
Although these cases do not readily lend themselves to categorization, a
significant number have involved the issue of whether the stay and in-
junctive powers of the bankruptcy court are sufficient or appropriate to
prevent proceedings by state and local agencies to revoke or condition
the continuance or renewal of various types of licenses held by debtors.
The obvious importance of the licensing availability is that often the
debtor must possess the license as a condition to the operation and reha-
bilitation of its business.
One general field in which courts have addressed the availability of
115. Id.
116. 11 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981).
117. Id. at 522.
118. Id.; see supra note 19.
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section 362(b)(4) in the application of health and safety laws involves
interpretations of medical board and hospital licensing. These cases pres-
ent some interesting policy conflicts in that a threshold inquiry would
support permitting the government to enforce health care laws for the
protection of the public. When the issue does not deal directly with
health care, but actually involves financial aspects of the debtor's busi-
ness, then the pecuniary purpose test has been applied to stay the govern-
ment's action.
In Sisk v. Massachusetts (In re Saugus General Hospital),' 19 decided
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the Massachusetts Department of
Public Health notified the hospital to discontinue admitting patients and
operating its emergency and surgical services until it had corrected cer-
tain administrative deficiencies. 20 Shortly after the Department's notifi-
cation, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the
hospital.12 ' Several weeks after the petition was fied, the Department
notified the hospital that its license to operate had been terminated based
on the hospital's discontinuance of its operations.' 22 The bankruptcy re-
ceiver filed a complaint seeking a determination that the termination of
the hospital's license violated the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Rule 11-
44(a). 23 The receiver also asked the court to determine whether its pre-
vious injunction prohibited enforcement of the license revocation. 124 The
court held that the termination of the hospital's license by the Depart-
ment did not involve an exercise of the police power in furtherance of the
public welfare, but was based instead on the hospital's financial difficul-
ties,'25 and therefore was subject to the automatic stay. 126
A similar approach was taken under the Code in Schatzman v. De-
partment of Health & Rehabilitative Services (In re King Memorial Hospi-
tal),'27 which concerned the validity of a determination by the Florida
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that the debtor-hospi-
tal had forfeited its exemption from certificate of need review to con-
struct a hospital. 2 ' The court found that the purpose of the state
statutes, which were the basis for the agency's actions, was not to protect
119. 1 COLLIER BANKS. CAS. 2d 26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1979).





125. Id. at 31-32.
126. Id. at 31.
127. 4 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
128. Id. at 705.
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health and welfare, but to establish community-oriented health goals that
could be reevaluated by providers, consumers, and public agencies.' 29
Additionally, the court noted that the agency's delay of several months
in initiating the forfeiture proceedings indicated that there was not an
"urgent" need to protect the public health and welfare.' 30 The court
held, therefore, that the Department was subject to the automatic stay
because its proceedings were designed to protect a pecuniary interest in
the debtor's property, rather than to protect the public health and
safety.13 1
In Greenwald v. Axelrod (In re Greenwald), 132 the New York State
Department of Health sought relief from the automatic stay in order to
complete administrative proceedings concerning the debtor's medicaid
reimbursement entitlements. 33 The Department had the responsibility
of setting medicaid reimbursement rates for residential health care facili-
ties, including the type operated by the debtor prior to commencement of
its Chapter 11 case. The Department, in its administrative review of the
rates, consolidated two audit appeals by the debtor regarding cost disal-
lowances and downward revisions of rates received by the debtor prior to
filing its bankruptcy petition. In addition, the Department filed a proof
of claim in the case for alleged medicaid overpayments to the debtor.' 34
The court found that the nursing home had been sold and that there
were no longer any patients who needed protection. Consequently, the
court indicated that the Department's actions constituted protection of a
pecuniary interest in the debtor's property to the extent of its claim for
medicaid overpayments 135 and held that the section 362(b)(4) exception
to the automatic stay was unavailable.' 36 The court did, however, grant
the Department's application for relief from the stay under section
362(d)(1) of the Code in order to complete the administrative proceed-
ings regarding the audit appeals.' 37 The court based its decision on the
following factors: (1) the administrative proceeding would not adversely
affect a potentially successful reorganization since the debtor was com-
pletely liquidating its properties; (2) the appeals hearings would not re-
129. Id. at 708-09.
130. Id. at 708.
131. Id.
132. 34 Bankr. 954 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
133. Id. at 957.
134. Id. at 956.
135. Id. at 957.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 958.
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suit in removing any property from the estate without a court order; and
(3) the progress of the case would not be hindered since the debtor had
the benefit of the stay for several years. 3
In contrast to Saugus General Hospital139 and King Memorial Hospi-
tal,14° the court in Lawson Burich Associates v. Axelrod (In re Lawson
Burich Associates) 4' held that section 362(b)(4) validly excepted from
the stay the New York State Health Department's state court action
(1) to have the Commissioner of Health appointed an interim receiver of
a residential health care facility; (2) to facilitate a turnover of funds to the
Commission; and (3) to obtain an injunction against the debtor as opera-
tor of the facility.142 The Department of Health initiated the state action
after it concluded that the debtor, as temporary receiver, had failed to
comply with certain provisions of a pre-petition agreement between the
debtor, the facility, the State of New York, and the Department of
Health. 143
The court noted that, in contrast to Saugus General Hospital,144 the
state's action was not directly related to the hospital's financial difficul-
ties. 145 The court rejected the debtor's assertion that the state improp-
erly sought a pecuniary benefit and found that the proceeding would
serve the public welfare by attempting to curb the debtor's alleged misap-
propriation of funds, which were vital to the operation of the facility.1 46
Thomassen v. Division of Medical Quality Assurance (In re Thomas-
sen)147 also dealt with the distinctions between a valid state action to
further the public health and one which was improperly motivated by a
desire to obtain a pecuniary advantage over creditors of the estate. In
Thomassen, the State Board of Medical Quality Assurance began an ad-
ministrative action to examine allegations against the debtor of profes-
sional misconduct, including gross negligence or incompetence and acts
of dishonesty in financial dealings. 14  The court held that the Board's
proceedings served a valid police and regulatory purpose, since the alle-
gations involved malpractice and fraud in the handling of the patients'
138. Id. at 957-58.
139. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1979).
140. 4 Bankr. 704 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
141. 31 Bankr. 604 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
142. Id. at 613.
143. Id. at 605-07.
144. 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d at 26.
145. Lawson Burich, 31 Bankr. at 611.
146. Id. at 612-13.
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and employees' funds, rather than simply the failure to make payments
to the state or its citizens.149 Accordingly, the administrative proceeding
was excepted from the automatic stay under section 362(b)(4).150
Also, in In re 30 Hill Top Street Corp.,'5 ' the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Public Health sought dismissal of a bankruptcy case based on
the debtor's failure to remedy certain operational deficiencies in a nurs-
ing home. The court, in reliance upon Lawson Burich,l5 2 found that the
Department, under section 362(b)(4), could properly enforce its order
against the debtor denying new patient admissions to the debtor's facility
until the state law violations were remedied. 5 3 The court further deter-
mined that, due to lack of funds in the case, the trustee was unable to
operate the nursing home in compliance with state law as required by 28
U.S.C. § 959 and that dismissal of the case was necessary in order to
allow appointment of a state court receiver to assume control of the
debtor's operations.' 54
A second field in which section 362(b)(4) has been applied in cases
involving health and safety laws may generally be classified as liquor li-
censing. The leading pre-Code case in that area, Colonial Tavern, Inc. v.
Byrne (In re Colonial Tavern, Inc.), '5 dealt with whether a state agency
administrative action to suspend a debtor's liquor license should be en-
joined pursuant to the Bankruptcy Rule 11-44 156 stay or the court's in-
149. Id. at 909.
150. Id. at 910.
151. 42 Bankr. 517 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
152. 31 Bankr. at 604.
153. Hill Top, 42 Bankr. at 522.
154. Id. at 521-22.
155. 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976).
156. Bankruptcy Rule 11-44(a), the automatic stay provision in Chapter XI cases under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, provided:
A petition filed under Rule 11-6 or 11-7 shall operate as a stay of the commencement
or the continuation of any court or other proceeding against the debtor, or the enforcement
of any judgment against him, or of any act or the commencement or continuation of any
court proceeding to enforce any lien against his property, or of any court proceeding, ex-
cept a case pending under Chapter X of the Act, for the purpose of the rehabilitation of the
debtor or the liquidation of his estate.
11 U.S.C. app. Rule 11-44 (repealed 1978). The court in Colonial Tavern noted:
Rule 11-44 is the counterpart of § 314 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 714) in that
it makes automatic the stays which the Bankruptcy Court is authorized to impose under
§ 314 on application of the debtor. The purpose and subject matter are the same: Basi-
cally, to protect the assets of the debtor from independent attack by creditors pending the
course of the Chapter XI arrangement.
420 F. Supp. at 45 (citation omitted). Section 314 of the Bankruptcy Act provided:
The Court may, in addition to the relief provided by section 29 of this title and else-
where under this chapter, enjoin or stay until final decree the commencement or continua-
tion of suits other than suits to enforce liens upon the property of a debtor, and may, upon
19851
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junctive powers. The Boston Licensing Board and the Massachusetts
Alcohol Beverage Control Commission, after an adversary hearing, had
ordered the suspension of the debtor's liquor license for violation of a
midnight closing regulation. The debtor sought a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the suspension, but the bankruptcy court refused
the request on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to interfere
with the comprehensive regulatory laws of a state.157
The majority of courts, however, have determined that state and lo-
cal licensing agencies should be stayed from revoking a debtor's liquor
license for violation of various regulations. Generally, the government's
action has been characterized as improperly motivated by financial con-
siderations, such as the debtor's failure to pay its taxes, rather than by
the valid purpose of protecting the public.
For example, in Industrial National Bank v. Miceli (In re Gen-
carelli),158 the bankruptcy court held that a municipal government's at-
tempted revocation of the debtor's liquor license for its failure to remain
open for business the number of hours required by state law would be
stayed."5 9 The court stated that enforcement of such a statute, which
deals with the absence of business activity, was not the type of regulatory
action intended to be excepted from the automatic stay, since the public
health or safety was not threatened." °
Also, several courts have held that a state's administrative action to
revoke or condition a debtor's liquor license would be stayed as improp-
erly motivated by a pecuniary purpose, rather than authorized by its po-
lice or regulatory power. For example, in Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Licensing
Board (In re Aegean Fare, Inc.), 61 a city licensing board did not renew
the debtor's liquor and restaurant licenses due to its nonpayment of pre-
petition meals taxes to the Commonwealth.162 The Board based its deci-
sion upon the debtor's failure to satisfy the provisions of a state statute
which conditioned renewal of the licenses upon the licensee's certification
notice and for cause shown, enjoin or stay until final decree any act or the commencement
or continuation of any proceeding to enforce any lien upon the property of a debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 714 (repealed 1978).
157. Colonial Tavern, 420 F. Supp. at 46. "Nothing in the prior case law of § 314 or the avail-
able history of Rule 11-44 suggests that the Bankruptcy Act was ever intended by Congress to
subvert the valid police power of the states in this manner." Id.
158. 14 Bankr. 751 (Bankr. D.RII. 1981).
159. Id. at 753.
160. Id.
161. 35 Bankr. 923 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
162. Id. at 924-25.
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that it had complied with the Commonwealth's tax laws. 163 The Board
contended that its licensing actions were initiated pursuant to a valid
regulatory purpose and that it did not seek to collect taxes by revoking
the license. 164 The court rejected the Board's argument and found that
although the Board's purpose was not to frustrate the priorities provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code, the effect of the enforcement measure was
to obtain a pecuniary advantage for the state over other creditors. 165 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the provisions violated the supremacy
clause and that the Board was subject to the automatic stay.' 66
Also, In re Mason 67 considered whether the State of Tennessee
should be enjoined from attempting to revoke a debtor's liquor license.
The state contended that it should be permitted to proceed with an ad-
ministrative hearing to determine if the license should be revoked be-
cause the debtor's name appeared on the tax delinquency rolls three
times during a calendar year in contravention of state law.' 68
The state asserted that the administrative proceeding was not based
on a pecuniary purpose169 and that it was not seeking to enforce a pre-
petition debt, as the debtor owed no money to the state on the date the
bankruptcy petition was filed. The court agreed that the administrative
action was a valid exercise of the state's police or regulatory power and
thus was not subject to the automatic stay. It further stated that the
action should nevertheless be conditionally stayed under section 105(a)
of the Code,' 70 because the liquor license was a substantial asset of the
estate and the state's revocation action would constitute a "threat to the
estate's assets."'' The court adopted a balancing approach in making
that determination, by stating that the loss of the license would diminish
the value of the estate to the detriment of creditors, that the costs of
prolonged litigation in the administrative proceedings would frustrate the
debtor's plan of reorganization, and that the continuance of the debtor's
163. Id. at 925.
164. Id. at 926.
165. Id. at 927-28.
166. Id. at 928; see also In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 36 Bankr. 829, 832 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984)
(California State Board of Equalization and the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control were
stayed from restricting the transfer of the debtor's liquor licenses to obtain the payment of delin-
quent pre-petition taxes); Pizza of Hawaii, Inc. v. Department of Taxation (In re Pizza of Hawaii,
Inc.), 12 Bankr. 796, 799 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1981) (City Liquor Commission was stayed from condi-
tioning its renewal of the debtor's liquor license upon receipt of a state tax clearance).
167. 18 Bankr. 817 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982).
168. Id. at 819-20.
169. Id. at 820.
170. Id. at 822.
171. Id. at 824.
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business would not pose a threat to the health or safety of Tennessee
residents. 172
C. Labor
Governmental proceedings to enforce various labor laws against
debtors have typically been viewed as falling within the section 362(b)(4)
exception to the automatic stay, perhaps because the nature of relief
sought is often directed at enjoining unfair labor practices. In those in-
stances when the government action seeks compensation from the
debtor, however, courts generally have determined that the proceeding is
subject to the stay.
A leading pre-Code case, NLRB v. Jonas (In re Bel Air Chateau
Hospital),73 considered whether NLRB proceedings against the debtor
to correct alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act would
be subject to the stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. 74 The NLRB
sought to enforce its pre-petition order against the debtor for its refusal
to bargain with a certified bargaining representative of its employees. In
a consolidated case, the NLRB also proceeded against a debtor with un-
fair labor practice charges for wrongful discharge of several employees.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, va-
cated the stays issued by lower courts against the NLRB175 and stated
that regulatory proceedings such as those initiated by the NLRB should
not be subject either to the automatic stay of Bankruptcy Rule 11-44176
or to a discretionary stay pursuant to section 314.117
172. Id. at 822-24. The court conditioned its stay upon, among other things, the timely payment
of the debtor's tax obligations to the state. Id. at 824. But see In re Arnage, Inc., 33 Bankr. 663, 665
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (state liquor control commission was not stayed from cancelling the
debtor's liquor license for failure of the trustee to file with the commission the proper request for an
extension of the license).
173. 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979).
174. Id. at 1249.
175. Id. at 1251.
176. Id. The court followed Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1977), in which the Supreme
Court held that the NLRB, rather than a bankruptcy forum, was entitled to liquidate the amount of
a back pay award owed by the bankruptcy debtor to its employees under an NLRB order. The
court, summarizing Nathanson, stated: "[Where the matter has been entrusted by Congress to an
administrative agency, the bankruptcy court should normally stay its hand pending an administra-
tive decision because Congress has entrusted to the agency the authority to determine appropriate
remedies." Bel Air Chateau, 611 F.2d at 1250.
177. 611 F.2d at 1251. The court also stated:
This result appears harmonious with the new bankruptcy law that recently became
effective. Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), the filing of a petition will normally operate as a
stay of judicial or administrative proceedings. Section 362(b)(4), however, provides that
the filing of a petition does not automatically stay an action by a governmental unit to
enforce the government's police or regulatory power. Instead, stays will be granted only if
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In NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co.,178 the NLRB sought to enforce its
decision ordering a debtor to reinstate with back pay two employees who
were discriminatorily discharged. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, finding some support for its decision in dicta in Bel
Air Chateau79 and In re Shippers Interstate Service, 8 decided under the
old Bankruptcy Act, held that the NLRB proceeding against the debtor
fell within the section 362(b)(4) exception because the purpose of the ac-
tion, to enforce certain employer-employee rights, constituted an exercise
of police or regulatory power."'1
In Marshall v. Tauscher (In re Tauscher),'8 2 the court determined
that administrative proceedings brought by the Secretary of Labor for
alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act would be excepted
from the automatic stay to the extent that they fixed penalties and pro-
vided for the entry of a money judgment. 8 3 Enforcement of a money
judgment, though, would be subject to the automatic stay.184 Similarly,
in D.M. Barber, Inc v. Valverde (In re D.M. Barber, Inc. ), 85 the court
recognized that the "compliance" stage of NLRB proceedings, which
fixes the amount of debtor's liability for committing an unfair labor prac-
tice, is incident to the exercise of its regulatory power and within the
section 362(b)(4) exception. 86 As in Tauscher, the court noted that en-
a party shows the necessity for a stay. Section 362 thus makes explicit the principles of the
old bankruptcy law: stays of regulatory proceedings should not be automatic but are ap-
propriate when it is likely that the court proceedings will threaten the estate's assets.
Id. Similarly, in In re Shippers Interstate Serv., 618 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1980), the court held that the
NLRB could proceed with an unfair labor practice case against a Chapter XI debtor where the
estate's assets were not threatened and the company was being reorganized rather than liquidated.
Shippers Interstate, 618 F.2d at 13; accord NLRB v. Brada Miller Freight Systems (In re Brada
Miller Freight Systems), 16 Bankr. 1002 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981); see also Rath Packing Co. v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union (In re Rath Packing Co.), 38 Bankr. 552 (Bankr.
N.D. Iowa 1984) (alleged litigation expense and discouragement to potential buyers or investors did
not pose a sufficient "threat" to the estate's assets to justify § 105(a) relief); GHR Energy Corp. v.
NLRB (In re GHR Energy Corp.), 33 Bankr. 449,450-51 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (the court rejected
the debtor's contention that an NLRB proceeding against the debtor regarding alleged wrongful
discharge of employees in violation of the National Labor Relations Act would place a "cloud" on
the title of the debtor's refinery sufficient to pose a threat to the debtor's estate).
178. 639 F.2d 291, 293 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981).
179. 611 F.2d at 1248.
180. 618 F.2d at 9.
181. Evans, 639 F.2d at 293; accord Donovan v. Timbers of Woodstock Restaurant, 19 Bankr.
629, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
182. 7 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981).
183. Id. at 920.
184. Id.
185. 13 Bankr. 962 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
186. Id. at 963; see also Donovan v. TMC Indus., 20 Bankr. 997, 1006 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982)
(the Secretary of Labor could properly maintain an injunctive action to prevent the debtor from
shipping tainted goods in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act).
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forcement of a money judgment against the debtor would not be excepted
from the automatic stay.1 87 Both decisions reflect a proper application of
section 362(b)(4) by permitting government actions to proceed when
public welfare issues are at stake, while curbing actions aimed at ob-
taining a financial advantage over other creditors of a debtor's estate.
A mixed result with regard to the applicability of section 362(b)(4)
occurred in In re Howell,l"' in which the Department of Labor sought a
determination that, pursuant to the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act (FECA), the Department had exclusive jurisdiction to determine dis-
ability, amount of payment, overpayment, rate of recoupment, and any
subsequent redetermination of disability of the debtor.1 9 The debtor had
received disability payments from the Department pursuant to FECA,
but a determination of overpayment was made and a specified amount
withheld by the Department from the debtor's monthly disability benefits
to recover the overpayments. The bankruptcy court recognized that de-
terminations of the debtor's disability by the Department would not be
stayed in the absence of creditor action. 190 On the other hand, the court
stated that it had jurisdiction as to any claims by the Department against
the debtor, and, therefore, the Department had no authority to withhold
amounts from the debtor's benefits merely to recapture the
overpayments. 
19 1
187. Tauscher, 13 Bankr. at 963-64.
188. 4 Bankr. 102 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
189. Id at 104.
190. Id. A proceeding involving unfair labor practice allegations may or may not be stayed,
then, depending upon the nature of the relief sought. For example, in In re Powell, 27 Bankr. 146
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983), the court explained such distinctions as follows:
An unfair labor practice proceeding has two purposes. One is to enforce the national
labor policy established by law. The other is to grant relief to particular parties who may
have suffered damage by reason of violation of the law. Remedies are both prospective,
such as the posting of notices or agreements as to future conduct, and retroactive, such as
the awarding of back pay. Vindication of the policies of the Act may require remedies of
both kinds.
Prospective remedies, usually not pecuniary, may be dealt with in reorganization.
Retroactive remedies, usually pecuniary, create a different problem. Such a remedy repre-
sents a claim which must be dealt with by the bankruptcy court which may or may not
allow it.
In re Powell, 27 Bankr. at 147.
191. Howell, 4 Bankr. at 109. But see Donovan v. Quinta Contractors (In re Quinta Contrac-
tors), 34 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983) (Secretary of Labor was not stayed from instituting
administrative proceedings to establish the extent of the debtor's liability under the Davis-Bacon Act
to withhold amounts payable to the debtor under certain government contracts, and from paying the
sums directly to thc debtor's employees for back wages). Also, in Donovan v. LaPorta (In re
LaPorta), 26 Bankr. 687 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982), the bankruptcy court reopened a Chapter 7 case
after discharge of the debtor in order to allow the Secretary of Labor to proceed with an administra-
tive hearing involving alleged violations by the debtor of the Service Contract Act and to determine
the rightful ownership of funds withheld by the Secretary but due to the debtor under certain gov-
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Ohio v. Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co. (In re Mansfield Tire & Rubber
Co.)1 92 involved an appeal by the Industrial Commission of Ohio, Bureau
of Workers' Compensation from a bankruptcy court order. The order
had determined that although the state's workers' compensation laws
were a valid exercise of its police power, the Commission's actions in
adjudicating workers' compensation claims did not amount to an en-
forcement of the police or regulatory powers of the state and therefore
were not excepted from the automatic stay.193 The court of appeals re-
versed and vacated the automatic stay with respect to the Commission's
administration of workers' compensation claims, 194 finding no distinction
between the enactment of the workers' compensation laws as a proper
exercise of the state's police or regulatory power and the administration
of claims arising under those laws.' 9 5 Further, the court noted that the
administrative actions of the Commission gave it no preferential treat-
ment over creditors of the debtor and did not interfere with the property
of the debtor's estate. 96
In Herr v. Maine (In re Herr),197 the debtor challenged administra-
tive proceedings held by the Maine Bureau of Employment Security, in
which the Bureau established that the debtor had fraudulently received
an overpayment of unemployment benefits. The Bureau also fixed the
amount of overpayment and disqualified the debtor from receiving bene-
fits for a six-month period. 19 The court, although not distinguishing the
holding in Mansfield Tire,199 stated that not every proceeding before the
Maine Bureau would constitute an enforcement of police power within
the meaning of section 362(b)(4).'oc Since this proceeding involved alle-
gations of fraud, however, the court held that it fell clearly within the
intent of that exception.2° ' The problem with the Mansfield Tire ap-
eminent contracts. The court held that enforcement of the Service Contract Act, which provides for
minimum wages and benefits for employees of government contractors, was not an attempt to pro-
tect a pecuniary interest in the debtor's property, but served a valid public interest of protecting
employees' rights. In re LaPorta, 26 Bankr. at 691. Furthermore, since the proceeding was a Chap-
ter 7 liquidation case with a "no asset" determination, its effect on the debtor's estate was speculative
and would probably not result in diminution of the estate for distribution to creditors. Id. at 692.
192. 660 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1982).
193. Id. at 1113.
194. Id. at 1115.
195. Id. at 1113.
196. Id.
197. 28 Bankr. 465 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
198. Id. at 466.
199. 660 F.2d at 1108.
200. Herr, 28 Bankr. at 467.
201. Id. at 469.
19851
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proach is that a legislative pronouncement that a statute advances the
public welfare simply cuts too wide a swath. Certain state laws are
designed only to protect state financial interests. Thus, potentially com-
peting Code considerations, such as aiding the orderly administration of
the estate or giving debtors a temporary shield from creditor interfer-
ence, are ignored. Accordingly, the analysis presented in Herr is more
sensible and accurate because it considers the purpose and effect of the
enforcement of state laws against debtors.202
In Theobald Industries v. Local 786, International Chemical Work-
ers Union (In re Theobald Industries),0 3 a union brought NLRB admin-
istrative proceedings against the debtor to determine the validity of
unfair labor practice charges involving vacation and severance pay,
clothing allowances, and interest. The court held that the unfair labor
practice proceedings were regulatory in nature, but that they were pri-
marily related to the protection of a pecuniary interest in the debtor's
estate and therefore were subject to the automatic stay.2" Similarly, in
Continental Airlines v. National Mediation Board (In re Continental Air-
lines),20 5 the court held that administrative hearings by the National Me-
diation Board on a union's application to become certified as
representative of certain employees of the debtor would be subject to the
automatic stay.2 0 6 The court found that the potential election regarding
certification did not constitute an "urgent" need for the exercise of police
power. 20
7
A different application of the stay in the context of administrative
proceedings was involved in In re Mazama Timber Products.20 8  In
Mazama, the Oregon Department of Human Resources sought relief
from the automatic stay in order to continue its proceedings to determine
whether the debtor was liable for a deficiency in unemployment tax pay-
ments. The court did not address whether the proceedings were a valid
exercise of a governmental unit's police or regulatory power, but instead
found that "cause" existed under section 362(d)(1) of the Code to modify
the stay.20 9 This would allow the Department to proceed with a determi-
nation of the deficiency amount, while staying any collection remedies
202. Id. at 466.
203. 16 Bankr. 537 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1981).
204. Id. at 539.
205. 40 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984).
206. Id. at 306.
207. Id. at 305.
208. 34 Bankr. 556 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
209. Id. at 557.
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against the debtor.21° The court referred to the appropriate state court
forum any issues regarding the validity of the assessment, but retained its
jurisdiction to determine the allowability and dischargeability of claims
against the debtor.21'
D. Financial Integrity
A number of cases which have addressed the applicability of the
automatic stay to proceedings brought by governmental units may gener-
ally be categorized as dealing with the financial integrity of the debtor.
The apparent conflict presented is whether the government's action has
the primary purpose of advancing consumer protection or other valid
police or regulatory interests or whether it is merely an attempt to obtain
an unfair financial benefit for the government. Since the subject matter
of these cases often directly involves control over or interests in the
debtor's estate, virtually all of the decisions have resolved the issue by
finding that the automatic stay applies and that the governmental unit's
proceeding does not fall within the section 362(b)(4) exception.
The leading case dealing with the financial integrity of the debtor is
Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court.2" 2 In that case, the debtors,
who operated public grain elevators in Missouri and Arkansas, author-
210. Id.
211. Id. at 557-58.
212. 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); see also In re Rath Packing
Co., 35 Bankr. 615, 622 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (Iowa State Insurance Commission revocation of
debtor's self-insurance exemption from state workers' compensation requirements based upon
debtor's insolvency violated automatic stay); Hill v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Hill), 19 Bankr.
375, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (Farmers Home Administration declared in contempt for attempt-
ing to setoff Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service funds to which Chapter 11 debtor
might be entitled against debt owed to FmHA); Muzio v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 17 Bankr. 528,
531 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) (state was stayed from post-petition enforcement of its financial respon-
sibility statute against debtor involved in accident); Sachs v. Ryan (In re Ryan), 15 Bankr. 514, 519
(Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (state was stayed from pursuing forfeiture proceedings against certain funds of
the debtor, as such proceedings under state law were neither a criminal action nor constituted an
action by a governmental unit seeking enforcement of police ot regulatory powers); Heckler Land
Dev. Corp. v. Township of Montgomery (In re Heckler Land Dev. Corp.), 15 Bankr. 856, 858
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (township action in state court to obtain funds from escrow account estab-
lished by debtor to serve as completion guarantee of land development project held subject to auto-
matic stay); Campbell v. Gerace, 13 Bankr. 575, 576 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (actions of Attorney
General in taking judgment, perfecting a putative lien, and threatening legal action for debtor's
nonpayment of state income tax violated automatic stay such that the court awarded actual damages
to debtors and continued civil contempt proceedings against the state); In re Adana Mortgage Bank-
ers, Inc., 12 Bankr. 989, 998 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (Government National Mortgage Association
post-petition declaration of default and termination of debtor's status as an issuer under certain
mortgage servicing agreements held subject to automatic stay), vacated, 687 F.2d 344 (11th Cir.
1982); Gibbs v. Housing Auth. (In re Gibbs), 9 Bankr. 758, 763 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (public
housing authority was not exercising a police or regulatory power when it sought to evict a tenant
pursuant to a state court judgment for possession based on nonpayment of rent).
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ized the Missouri Department of Agriculture to operate and liquidate
insolvent grain warehouses in accordance with Missouri law several days
prior to filing petitions in bankruptcy. The Department filed receivership
petitions for the grain warehouses in state court, and the receiver was
appointed shortly after the bankruptcy filing, with orders to operate or
liquidate the inventory to protect the interests of persons storing grain in
the facilities.213 The bankruptcy court appointed a trustee, who subse-
quently filed a request to sell the grain free and clear of all liens.2 14 In
response to the trustee's petition, Missouri authorities obtained a state
court temporary restraining order against the trustee and a directive that
the Department take possession of the grain warehouses.215
The State of Missouri sought a writ of prohibition in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and appealed from a dis-
trict court order" 6 holding that the bankruptcy court possessed exclusive
jurisdiction over the debtors' estate and that the state action was not
excepted from application of the automatic stay. The Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's holding and denied the petition for writ of
prohibition. 217
With respect to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, the Eighth
Circuit found that the debtors' possession of and small ownership inter-
est in the grain constituted a sufficient legal or equitable interest within
the broad scope of section 541 of the Code to trigger preliminary jurisdic-
tion over the property in bankruptcy court.218 The court limited that
holding, though, by emphasizing that the bankruptcy court must admin-
ister the debtors' interests in accordance with the ownership rights of
holders of documents of title under applicable state law.219
Furthermore, the court rejected the state's contention that the en-
forcement of its grain laws constituted a valid exercise of its police or
regulatory power excepted by section 362(b)(4) from the automatic
stay.22 The court concluded that Missouri's grain laws were regulatory
in nature, but primarily functioned to protect a pecuniary interest in the
debtors' property rather than public safety and health.221 Alternatively,
213. Missouri, 647 F.2d at 771.
214. Id. at 772.
215. Id. at 772-73.
216. In re Missouri, 7 Bankr. 974 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980).
217. Missouri, 647 F.2d at 773-74.
218. Id. at 774.
219. Id. at 774-75.
220. Id. at 776.
221. Id. The court stated:
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the court stated that even if the state liquidation proceedings were within
the section 362(b)(4) exception, the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over
administration of the debtors' estate would preempt the state laws.222
Also, in Joe DeLisi Fruit Co. v. Minnesota (In re Joe DeLisi Fruit
Co.), 223 the debtor, a dealer in wholesale produce, sought to enjoin the
Minnesota Department of Agriculture from proceeding to determine
claims by its suppliers against a letter of credit. The debtor, as part of its
state licensing requirements, had obtained the letter of credit to ensure
the performance of its statutory duties. The failure to pay suppliers
when due constituted a breach of state statute and permitted claims
against the letter of credit. The suppliers notified the state Commissioner
of Agriculture that the debtor had defaulted in the payments, and the
Commissioner issued a notice setting forth the procedure to persons to
make a claim against the letter of credit.224
The court did not address the Department's contention that since
the letter of credit was not property of the debtor the stay did not apply
to its proceeding.225 The court stated instead that the scope of the stay
did more than prevent claims against assets of the debtor; it also gave the
debtor the opportunity to organize its affairs without having to defend
itself from creditors.226 The court also held that the Department's ac-
tions were not excepted from the stay by virtue of section 362(b)(4), be-
cause the proceeding dealt primarily with the financial affairs of the
debtor rather than the protection of public health, safety, or welfare.227
In light of the legislative history and court decisions under the earlier bankruptcy act, we
believe that the term "police or regulatory power" refers to the enforcement of state laws
affecting health, welfare, morals, and safety, but not regulatory laws that directly conflict
with the control of the res or property by the bankruptcy court.
Id.
222. Id.
223. 11 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
224. Id. at 695.
225. Id. at 695-96. The court stated, "[t]he action commenced by the Commissioner is an ad-
ministrative, quasi-judicial proceeding.... Evidence is present [sic], witnesses are examined and
cross-examined. A hearing officer presides and awards judgment to the prevailing party. Ulti-
mately, the Minnesota Supreme Court may review the matter on appeal. The action is against the
debtor." Id. at 696.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 696-97. The court stated:
The action by the Commissioner is not to restrain or punish any violation of the stat-
ute. It is not to determine licensing requirements or to collect damages from the debtor for
violation. The State of Minnesota is not the complainant. The action is by and for the
benefit of the creditors of the debtor. Any recovery will be to their benefit. The statute
which proscribes this procedure was enacted to provide "financial protection" for a certain
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In In re Jacobsmeyer,223 the debtors, who filed for reorganization of
their retail liquor store under Chapter 13 of the Code, filed an application
for an order to show cause why the Missouri Department of Liquor Con-
trol and several wholesale liquor distributors should not be held in con-
tempt for violation of the automatic stay. The debtor alleged that the
wholesalers refused to fill purchase orders even on a C.O.D. basis be-
cause they were concerned about violating state laws. The purpose of the
state law involved was to prevent financial control of the retailer by a
wholesaler through extraordinary extensions of credit.229
The bankruptcy court acknowledged that the state purpose of keep-
ing certain liquor activities financially separated reached conduct affect-
ing the public welfare and only indirectly protected pecuniary
interests.230 The court further found, however, that the unintended re-
sult of the statute's enforcement was to require debtors to pay certain
unsecured pre-petition debts in full, resulting in preferential or discrimi-
natory treatment of some creditors in the Chapter 13 plan.231 As a re-
sult, the court enjoined the state Director of Liquor Control from
enforcing the credit regulations against the wholesalers to the extent that
enforcement required the debtors to pay pre-petition debts to obtain
goods to operate.232
Only a handful of cases dealing with the financial integrity of the
debtor have found a governmental unit's proceeding to be excepted from
the stay under section 362(b)(4). For example, in Fintel v. Oregon (In re
Fintel),233 the State of Oregon sought enforcement of Builders Board or-
ders finding the debtor liable to claimants under a surety bond obtained
by the debtor. The debtor had posted the bond pursuant to a state con-
sumer protection statute designed to protect the public from financially
irresponsible builders. The bankruptcy court permitted enforcement of
the Board's order over objections by the debtor that it needed the bond
for future licensing and that it might suffer loss of Builder's registration
as an indirect consequence of losing the bond.234 The court premised the
holding on its finding that the state law was a valid exercise of police or
regulatory power and that neither the individual claimants nor the Board
interfered with the bankruptcy proceeding or reduced the debtor's
228. 13 Bankr. 298 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
229. Id. at 300.
230. Id. at 301.
231. Id. at 302.
232. Id.
233. 10 Bankr. 50 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981).
234. Id. at 52.
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Also, in Swan v. Dervos (In re Dervos),2 36 the bankruptcy court de-
termined that a proceeding against the debtor for restitution to certain
individuals under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act consti-
tuted a valid exercise of police or regulatory power.2 37 The court based
its holding on the view that the state sought to protect the interests of its
citizens against fraud and to prevent the repetition of future fraudulent
behavior.238
Finally, in Cannon v. Missouri (In re Cannon),239 the State of Mis-
souri sought a permanent injunction and restitution to individuals who
suffered harm because of alleged violations by the debtor of statutes per-
taining to merchandising practices. The court held that, to the extent
that the state proceeding involved restitution or a money judgment, it
would be automatically stayed.24 In ruling on the injunction, the court
decided not to consider the action under section 362(b)(4), but found that
sufficient "cause" existed under section 362(d) of the Code to justify re-
lief from the stay.2 41 The court recognized the following reasons in find-
ing that cause existed: (1) the state court and bankruptcy court trials
were set for the same time; (2) the lack of precedent under the state stat-
utes regarding merchandising practices left it unclear whether a judg-
ment against the debtor would include a fixed dollar amount; (3) the
issues were ripe for adjudication in state court; (4) repetitive litigation
would be avoided; (5) determination of the merits would be expedited;
and (6) the administration of the liquidating Chapter 7 case would not be
adversely affected by the state court proceeding.242
E. Securities Regulation
Only a few cases have addressed the application of the automatic
stay to proceedings involving securities regulations. In the government
235. Id.
236. 37 Bankr. 731 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984).
237. Id. at 734.
238. Id. In FTC v. R.A. Walker & Assoc., 37 Bankr. 608 (D.D.C. 1983), the district court
declined to modify its temporary restraining order imposing a freeze on the debtor's assets and
enjoining persons having control of records, accounts, and assets of the debtor from disposing of
them. The court stated that the jurisdiction of the district court to freeze the debtor's assets would
not be impaired by the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, since the debtor was accused of fraudu-
lent conduct, no liquidation of the estate was contemplated, and no trustee had yet been appointed to
prevent dissipation of the assets. 37 Bankr. at 610-12.
239. 30 Bankr. 565 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983).
240. Id. at 567.
241. Id.; see supra note 18 for text of section 3 62(d).
242. Cannon, 30 Bankr. at 567-68.
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proceedings which have alleged violations of the anti-fraud provisions of
the state and federal securities laws, the section 362(b)(4) exception has
been clearly available. Conversely, when the government action has been
directed at obtaining some financial compensation from the debtor,
courts have been more inclined to find that the proceeding runs afoul of
the pecuniary purpose test.
In SEC v. First Financial Group,"AS the Securities and Exchange
Commission brought a civil enforcement action for injunctive relief and
for appointment of a temporary receiver of the defendant's assets, alleg-
ing violation of certain anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. The defendants had sold to the public a securities package com-
prised of federally guaranteed student loans and a repurchase agreement,
but the defendants failed to deposit the securities for safekeeping and
then defaulted in their repurchase obligations.'
The district court, prior to the filing of any petition in bankruptcy,
preliminarily enjoined the defendants from offering or selling the securi-
ties in violation of the federal securities laws and from disposing of cer-
tain records and assets of their business.24 Subsequently, after an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy had been filed against the defendant
corporation, the district court ordered the appointment of a temporary
receiver for the corporation. 2"
The debtor contended that the appointment of a temporary receiver
constituted an "act to obtain possession of property of the estate" within
the meaning of section 362(a)(3) of the Code and, therefore, was not ex-
cepted from the automatic stay by section 362(b)(4).247 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that there was
no stated exception to section 362(a)(3), but held that the appointment of
a temporary receiver was a necessary form of ancillary relief in an SEC
civil enforcement action for injunctive relief. 24
243. 645 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1981). In a later decision involving matters in the same case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a default judgment against First Finan-
cial officers for their failure to comply with discovery requests. 659 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1981).
244. 645 F.2d at 431-32.
245. Id. at 432.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 437-38.
248. Id. at 438. The court stated:
The district court's exercise of its equity power in this respect is particularly necessary in
instances in which the corporate defendant, through its management, has defrauded mem-
bers of the investing public; in such cases, it is likely that, in the absence of the appoint.
ment of a receiver to maintain the status quo, the corporate assets will be subject to
diversion and waste to the detriment of those who were induced to invest in the corporate
scheme and for whose benefit, in some measure, the SEC injunctive action was brought.
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On the other hand, in Coben v. Lebrun (In re Golden Plan, Inc.),24 9
the court held that the action of the California Franchise Tax Board in
suspending the corporate powers of the debtor for its failure to pay cer-
tain state taxes was subject to the automatic stay.2"' As a result of the
Board's suspension, a third party had filed articles of incorporation using
the debtor's corporate name. The court stated that since the Board's
action had violated the stay, its suspension was void, and the third
party's filing of incorporation documents had no effect.25' Further, the
court stated that a permanent injunction would properly issue under sec-
tion 105(a) against the third party, preventing appropriation of the
debtor's corporate name.252
III. CONCLUSION
Section 362(b)(4) provides a significant exception to the automatic
stay for the commencement or continuation of proceedings brought by
governmental units against debtors to enforce police or regulatory pow-
ers. An inherent conflict exists in determining whether the policy consid-
erations which favor shielding a debtor from creditor interference should
give way to countervailing policy concerns for protection of the public
from a debtor conducting its business in a manner detrimental to the
public health, welfare, and safety.
A proper evaluation of the applicability of section 362(b)(4) requires
a several-stage analysis, beginning with determining whether the action is
brought by a governmental unit. If it is not, then section 362(b)(4) is
unavailable, although relief from the stay may still be sought if "cause"
Id. (footnote omitted). The court further noted that the phrase "an act to obtain possession"
was not intended to include the judicial appointment of a receiver pursuant to a govern-
mental unit's enforcement of its police or regulatory powers (and the transfer of possession
of the violator's property to the receiver in order that he may perform his duty to maintain
the status quo). Rather, the automatic stay applies to prevent dismemberment of the estate
and insure its orderly distribution,... in order to eliminate the impetus for a race of
diligence by fast-acting creditors.
Id. at 439 (citations omitted); accord Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg.
Group, 700 F.2d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 1983); Commodity Futures Trading Conim'n v. Incomeo,
Inc., 649 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1981).
249. 37 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984).
250. Id. at 170.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 170-71. The court stated that the standard with respect to issuance of a permanent
injunction was that the defendant's actions will cause irreparable harm and that no adequate remedy
at law exists. In this case, the use of the debtor's corporate name would interfere with administra-
tion of the estate because it would cause confusion among third parties dealing with the trustee.
Furthermore, no adequate legal remedy was available because if the trustee was forced continually to
bring actions prohibiting the appropriation of the name, it would be prevented from properly ad-
ministering the estate. Id.
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exists under section 362(d). The next test is whether the governmental
action is brought to effectuate some public policy rather than simply to
adjudicate private rights. Courts have often neglected this inquiry, but it
is necessary in order to consider thoroughly whether the exception to the
stay should be available.
The third and most critical inquiry must be to determine whether
the purpose of the government's action is to enforce laws affecting the
public health and welfare, as contrasted to those proceedings which may
be characterized as an attempt to obtain a financial advantage over other
creditors or unreasonably to interfere with property of the debtor's es-
tate. This pecuniary purpose test is the cornerstone with respect to
whether a particular governmental action satisfies section 362(b)(4), prin-
cipally because most proceedings have some impact on the debtor's finan-
cial resources. It is imperative, then, for a court to consider the
motivating purpose behind a government's proceeding, rather than
merely to rely upon a legislative pronouncement that a given law was
enacted to protect the public welfare. In order to aid that analysis,
courts should consider the underlying policy considerations relevant to
the subject matter involved and the type of relief sought. Thus, an in-
junctive action to prevent a violation of an environmental law would nor-
mally merit an exception to the stay, while an action for damages for a
debtor's nonpayment of taxes should be stayed. The urgency with which
the government's action is instituted may be one factor in the pecuniary
purpose test, but is an unreasonable additional test for otherwise validly
commenced proceedings.
Finally, if a particular governmental proceeding satisfies the pecuni-
ary purpose and public policy tests, a court may issue a stay under its
discretionary authority pursuant to Code section 105(a) if it appears that
the government's action presents a sufficient threat to the assets of the
debtor's estate. This authority generally has been and should continue to
be applied sparingly, when the balance of interests favors extraordinary
relief for the debtor.
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